Estimating Investment Functions Based on Cointegration: The Case of China by Sun, L.
ESTIMATING INVESTMENT FUNCTIONS BASED 
ON COINTEGRATION: THE CASE OF CHINA 
Laixiang Sun 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
Laxenburg, Austria and 
Institute of Social Studies, The Hagu e, Netherlands 
RR-98-7 
July 1998 
Reprinted from Journal of Comparative Economics, Volume 26, 
Number 1, pp. 175- 191, March 1998. 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria 
Tel: +43 2236 807 Fax: +43 2236 73148 E-mail: publications@iiasa.ac.at 
Research Reports, which record research conducted at II ASA, are independently reviewed 
before publication. Views or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those 
of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other organizations supporting the 
work. 
Reprinted with permission from Journal of Comparative Economics, Volume 26, Number 1, 
pp. 175- 191, March 1998. 
Copyright © 1998 by Academic Press, Inc. 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any 
form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any 
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the copyright 
holder. 
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS 26, 175-191 (1998) 
ARTICLE NO. JE97 l 50 l 
Estimating Investment Functions Based 
on Cointegration: The Case of China 1 
Laixiang Sun 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, 
and Institute of Social Studies, the Hague, the Netherlands 
Received November 25, 1996; revised October 15, 1997 
Sun, Laixiang-Estimating Investment Functions Based on Cointegration: The Case 
of China 
In the Chinese context, a persistent tension exists between system-generated invest-
ment ambitions and both the supply and the distributive barriers to these ambitions. 
This holds for both pre- and postreform periods and across significant policy changes. 
As a result, the long-run investment function is characterized by equilibrium comove-
ment among real fixed investment level, grain output per capita as representative of 
necessary consumer goods, and effective energy supply per capita as representative 
of basic producer goods. A large part of the cyclical pattern of investment growth can 
be explained by the adjustment to the comovement path and by the relevant changes 
in energy supply and agricultural output. J. Comp. Econom., March 1998, 26(1), pp. 
175-191. International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, 
and Institute of Social Studies, the Hague, the Netherlands. © 1998 Academic Press 
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C5 l, E32, 021, P33. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
China has maintained quite high capital accumulation levels and aggregate 
investment ratios. 2 At the same time, state-sector fixed investment, which 
1 I am much indebted to John Bonin, Bill Wansing Hung, Karel Jansen, S13ren Johansen, 
Michie! Keyzer, Haris Psaradakis, Charles Rossmann, Ashwani Saith, Servaas Storm, Rob Vos, 
Marc Wuyts, and two anonymous referees of this journal for their help, comments, and advice. 
2 The average proportions of accumulation and state sector fixed investment in the National 
Income Used are 29.9 with a standard deviation (SD) of 6.65 and 19.5 with a SD of 5.27 during 
the 1953-1993 period; the same figures as a percentage of GDP are 27 .6 (SD 2.45) during 
1978-1993 and 18.3 (SD 2.19) during 1978-1995, when the relevant statistical figures were 
available (source: Statistical Yearbook of China, hereafter Yearbook, 1993, pp. 31, 43, 149; 1995, 
p. 137; 1996, pp. 42, 139). 
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accounts for a dominant share of gross fixed investment, 3 has displayed con-
spicuous cyclical patterns in its annual growth rate. The relevant amplitudes 
are very impressive in comparison with those of other socialist countries, 
e.g., the former Soviet Union and Eastern European.4 An interesting question 
thus arises: which mechanisms produce such persistent high investment ratios 
and what forces shape the remarkable cyclical patterns of these investment 
growth rates? 
According to the standard theory of socialist economies, the system con-
stantly initiates pressures and incentives to maximize investment and cannot 
generate internally self-imposed restraint to resist expansionary drives (Kor-
nai, 1992, Chap. 9). As a result, the realized real investment level has, on 
the one hand, accounted for quite a high proportion of the national income 
and has, on the other hand, been constrained by the supply possibilities frontier 
of bottleneck sectors. In the case of China, investment is limited by the 
tolerable adverse distributional impact it has on food supply. Against the 
background of significant policy change, a more interesting question is: has 
reform altered the investment coordination mechanism fundamentally? 
Initial data analysis shows a surprising lack of structural change in state-
owned industry in terms of the subsectoral shares of output, employment, 
and investment when compared with township- and village-run industry. This 
remarkable structural rigidity may imply that state-sector investment is not 
yet based mainly on market criteria and that the state investment system does. 
not respond actively to the changes in demand occurring in a rapidly growing 
and transforming economy. This finding motivates more accurate econometric 
modeling and testing based on cointegration and error correction approaches. 
In comparison with the traditional approach of constructing and estimating 
a planners' response function, 5 two major advantages of cointegration analysis 
are worth mentioning. First, as a statistical expression of a long-run equilib-
rium relationship among two or more nonstationary time series, cointegration 
can help to establish cycle analysis based on the behavioral assumption of 
intertemporal rationality. The approach based on a representative planner 
3 The percentage shares of state-sector fixed investment are 69.5 in 1981, 65.6 in 1990, and 
57 .0 in 1994 (Statistical Survey of China, 1994, p. 27; Yearbook, 1996, p. 139). The fact that 
statistics on total fixed investment covering all ownership types started only in 1981 prevents 
us from dealing with the patterns of total fixed investment for the pre-1980 period. 
4 There are seven investment cycles in China with lengths of 3-8 years in the 1953-1995 
period. The maximum and minimum values of real investment growth rates in China from 1953 
to 1995 are 84.5 and -62.5%, respectively; in the former Soviet Union 18.2 and 0.7%; in 
Hungary 36.0 and -23.3%; in Poland 25.4 and -22.3%; and in Bulgaria 51.2 and -2.2% from 
1951 to 1989, respectively (sources: for China, see Appendix; for the others, see Mihalyi, 1992, 
p. 120). 
5 For an extensive survey on this subject, see Mihalyi ( 1992). Attempts to apply such response 
functions to China include Naughton (1987) and Imai ( 1994). 
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faces the problem of intertemporal inconsistency of the planner's rationality 
(Mihalyi, 1992). Based on a cointegration approach, we can assume that the 
investment decision makers at different levels and different sectors are all 
rational economic agents and that, because of their own specific interests 
and incentives, they cannot be considered as representative planners. As a 
consequence, coordination mechanisms that prevail among economic agents 
are of decisive importance and cannot be ignored. Full information and ratio-
nality of individual choice are not sufficient to preclude the business cycle 
in a well-functioning market economy. The bureaucratic coordination mecha-
nism that characterizes the state investment system of China has also failed 
to prevent an investment cycle. 
Second, the cointegration relation presents a long-run equilibrium comove-
ment among the real investment level, supply, and distributive barriers to 
investment expansion. Thus, it can replace the traditional uni variate norm 
concept because it indicates clearly the long-run equilibrium determined by 
the fundamental tension between system-generated investment ambition and 
the supply and distributive barriers to that ambition. Moreover, such a com-
ovement path also serves as an attractor for the disequilibrium adjustment of 
the investment decision makers toward a dynamic equilibrium as shown by 
the error-correction model. 
Because the share of state-sector fixed investment has been very high and 
due to the data limitations noted, this paper focuses on fixed investment in 
the state sector only for the period of 1953-1995. For simplicity, investment 
hereafter refers to the state-sector fixed investment. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 first presents a brief analysis 
of the persistent investment hunger in the state sector during the reform period 
and then identifies the representative bottlenecks in both the consumer goods 
and producer goods sectors. In Section 3, the integration and cointegration 
properties of the data are analyzed, a long-run investment-level function and 
a conditional error-correction model of investment growth are presented, and 
the relevant weak exogeneity of the conditional variables is examined. Section 
4 summarizes the results. 
2. SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTIVE BARRIERS 
TO INVESTMENT EXPANSION 
The process of investment decision-making in the state sector is a distribu-
tion process of rights to possess and use certain scarce state assets, including 
budget funds, bank loans, land, quotas of power, oil, and other key materials 
in shortage. The primary intention of ministries, local governments and firms 
is to obtain and occupy as much investment and other assets from the bureau-
cratic distribution process as possible so that they can reap future benefits 
and justify both their existence and their power base. A simple but insightful 
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example is that of a state enterprise initially assigned a building or a piece 
of land in the commercial center of a city by negotiation or only by chance 
and making greater profits so that its employees can get more bonus simply 
by renting the building or land. This is the essential source of investment 
hunger at each level. As a consequence, when trying to establish a new 
investment project, the relevant decision makers usually pay only secondary 
attention to the future profitability of the project. It is good if the project is 
profitable but if it is not, the loss will be borne by the state anyway. Such 
an investment expansion drive, combined with the persistent soft-budget con-
straint (Zou and Sun, 1996), will certainly induce investment hunger and lead 
to inefficient allocation of investment. This consequence is well-understood 
by top-level Chinese planners but they have failed to address it. 6 This system-
generated investment hunger renders investment supply-constrained and is 
not about fine-tuning the level of investment. Rather it pushes relentlessly 
the economy toward overheating, thereby producing tensions that lead to 
subsequent error corrections. 
Treating food supply as a key constraint to industrial expansion is a persis-
tent idea in the study of developing economies. Kalecki (1976) treats the 
supply of foodstuffs, which he called necessities, as central to macroeconomic 
analysis in a developing economy, not simply an additional welfare issue. He 
interprets the problem of financing development as more than an adjustment 
of planned aggregate output to the available supply of necessities. His empha-
sis is on a distributive barrier between a rising investment rate and the requisite 
agricultural growth. 
This distributive barrier can be further substantiated by considering China's 
specific accumulation mechanism because its main characteristics are coercive 
extraction from agriculture and forced saving through depressing real wages 
and consumption (Lin et al., 1996, Chap. 2; Sheng, 1993). When a mechanism 
for extracting agricultural resources through both undervaluing agricultural 
products and the use of coercion is put into effect, the immediate result is a 
reduction in surplus products or a decrease in labor income. Consequently, 
the growth rate of either agricultural production or peasants' consumption 
declines. When agriculture is exploited so that it loses its comparative profit-
ability, the sector shrinks, disinvestment occurs, and real consumption levels 
of both the rural and the urban population fall. The continuous drop in con-
sumption levels may induce economic, social, and political instability. Under 
such a situation, the only way to resolve the crisis is to readjust the distributive 
6 For example, in his annual report to the 1997 National People' s Congress, Chen Jinhua, head 
of the State Planning Commission, once again blamed the poor performance of state-owned 
enterprises on overheated fixed investment, which Jed to excessive production capacity, insuffi-
cient use of facilities , low efficiency, high costs, and low competitiveness (People 's Daily, March 
4, 1997). 
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pattern of national income so as to transfer some resources back into agricul-
ture. This is the mechanism that links China's macroeconomic adjustment 
and related investment cycles much more closely to agricultural fluctuation 
than is the case in other countries.7 
The most important indicator for representing the agricultural situation in 
China is grain output per capita (GRNPC), first because of the crucial position 
of grain both in Chinese livelihood and in the national economy and second 
because grain is a relatively homogeneous, nonsubstitutable, and necessary 
commodity. Furthermore, its production takes up a large share of total agricul-
tural production and it has been in a comparatively unfavorable position 
within the socialist price and resource allocation systems. As a consequence, 
the grain supply is the binding constraint on the economy and the indicator 
grain output per capita is a barometer of agricultural production.8 If one can 
identify a variable to which the decision makers are most responsive on the 
basis of the frequency with which phrases appear in official documents and 
leading articles of official newspapers, the first candidate would be "grain 
output per capita.'' In addition to its political importance, this indicator is 
statistically sound and relatively error free. The data are comparable directly 
in terms of both time series and cross-section figures; its significance is clear 
and readily understood by both officials and the public. By comparison, 
other indicators designed by economists and statisticians, such as total factor 
productivity or the shortage index of consumer goods market are complicated, 
cumbersome, and controversial. Therefore, we employ GRNPC to indicate 
the agricultural supply capacity to support investment expansion. 
Intuitively speaking, investment goods, such as steel, cement, plate glass, 
and power should together or alternatively act as the direct bottleneck con-
straints to fixed investment. The reasons for using effective energy supply to 
represent comprehensively those bottlenecks are because energy includes 
power, gasoline, diesel fuel, coal, and other key investment goods and also 
because the long-lasting heavy-industry oriented development strategy has 
overdeveloped the producer goods sector that consequently maintains over 
7 Revealing such a two-way interaction between agricultural fluctuation and investment adjust-
ment does not imply that the agricultural fluctuation is fully determined by the interactions. This 
interdependence provides a sound basis for modeling investment cycles in China. Other factors 
such as weather and market effects make the causality from agriculture to investment more 
significant than the reverse. Thus, the agricultural variable appears to be weakly, but not strongly, 
exogenous in the system of equations modeling investment cycles. 
8 In 1995, the production of cereals in China was at a record of 416 million tons. However, 
the corresponding per capita quantity was only 340 kg, Jess than the 1994 world average of 348 
kg (Yearbook, 1996, pp. 69, 371, 811; 1995, p. 770). Among the various competitive uses of 
grain, its direct consumption as a foodstuff by humans accounts for 70% of the total production. 
In 1994 a least 80 million people still suffered from a shortage of basic food (People's Daily, 
Feb. 4, 1995, p. 2). 
180 LAIXIANG SUN 
20% of its equipment in idleness mainly because of the energy shortage (Lin 
et al., 1996, Chap. 3). Power stations frequently have to turn off generators 
because of coal shortages, although power shortage has been the most explicit 
source of trouble in the economy as manifested by frequent and unplanned 
electricity outages. Chinese media have reported repeatedly on factories, even 
steel plants, having to stop production because of power shortages, power 
stations having to switch off generators because of lack of coal, and transport 
having to cease because of oil shortages. These facts indicate clearly that, 
from the production side, the most significant cause of long-lasting shortage 
of investment goods is energy shortage.9 
The energy shortage is, in turn, closely linked to a transport bottleneck. A 
unique feature of energy consumption in China is that coal accounts for over 
three-quarters of primary commercial energy consumption (Yearbook, 1995, 
p. 199). However, because of transport constraints, coal shortages at industrial 
centers and coal stocks of above-storage capacity at mining centers have 
coexisted in most months. Furthermore, although the government has given 
top priority to coal transport in railway development since 1980, the incremen-
tal gaps of coal demand over coal freight volume and of coal output over the 
freight volume have increased steadily. Thus, the tension between energy 
demand and effective supply has persisted and even been aggravated. 10 
Under conditions of chronic energy shortages and transport constraints, the 
normal stock of coal and other energy at consumption sites has remained 
insignificant in comparison with annual total consumption. Thus, the indicator 
of energy consumption is equivalent to effective energy supply in terms of 
annual measurement, although energy output may be significantly different 
from energy consumption. Consider coal consumption for power generation 
as an example. Coal used for power generation accounts for about 25% of 
the total produced (Peng, 1989). The normal coal stock in power plants that 
have access to the coal supply directly planned by the state is equal to their 
weekly consumption and thus is only 1.7% of their annual consumption. 
During an energy crisis, coal stocks often equal their consumption quantity 
for only 2 or 3 days, an amount well less than 1 % of annual consumption 
(Liang, 1989; Zhang, 1991). Therefore, it is reasonable to take annual energy 
consumption as a proxy for effective energy supply. 
9 For relevant reports on this issue written by Chinese officials and researches, see, for example, 
Energy of China (Zhongguo Nengyuan) (1989, no. 2, pp. 6-9; no. 3, pp. 1-4; no. 6, pp. 31-
34; 1990, no. 3, pp. 4-9; no. 5, pp. 18-21; 1991 , no. 7, pp. 37-40; no. 10, pp. 5-15; 1992, 
no. 2, pp. 4-5; no. 3, pp. 5-10; no. 7, pp. 23-28), China Investment and Construction (Zhongguo 
Tou::.i yu Jianshe) (1988, no. 8, pp. 25-27; no. 12, pp. 18-19; 1989, no. 3, pp. 10-12). For the 
relevant literature in English, see Hussain (1995), Smil (1988), and World Bank (1985). 
10 For relevant reports on this issue, see, besides the last note, People 's Daily (9 March 1989, 
p. 5), China Information Daily (2 July 1993, p. I), China Investment and Construction (1992, 
no. 12, pp. 25-26). 
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3. COINTEGRA TION ESTIMATION AND INVESTMENT 
DETERMINATION EQUATIONS 
3.1. Modeling Approach 
181 
Following the literature of dynamic cointegration analysis (e.g., Hendry 
and Mizon, 1993), the starting point of modeling a nonstationary time-series 
system can be an unrestricted vector autoregression (UV AR) representation 
in the form of error correction for all endogenous variables in the system 
k-1 
D.Zr = IlZr-1 + L Il;D.Zr-i + µt + Er, (1) 
i=l 
where Zr is an (n X 1) vector of J(l) variables, Z-k+ 1, ... , Z0 are fixed, TI 
and TI; (i = 1, ... , k - 1) are (n X n) coefficient matrixes, µr is an (n X 1) 
constant vector, and Er is independently, normally distributed with mean 0 
and covariance matrix D. 
The hypothesis of cointegration is formulated as a restriction on the matrix 
TI, i.e., H,: TI = a{3', where {3 consists of the coefficient vectors of r cointegra-
tion relationships and a is the relevant adjustment coefficient matrix while 
the other parameters are left unrestricted. Thus, we use the Gaussian full-
information maximum likelihood (FIML) cointegration procedure proposed 
by Johansen and J uselius ( 1990) to find out the r cointegrating vectors and 
corresponding adjustment coefficients matrix. In order to reduce model (1) 
into the well-known single-equation analysis, we formulate a partial system 
as a conditional model and discuss its properties. In other words, for Zr = 
(yr, x; )', model (1) under the cointegration hypothesis H, can be factorized 
into a conditional equation for Yr given Xr and a marginal model for Xr as 
follows (Johansen, 1992b ): 
k-1 
D.yr = wD.Xr + (ay - wax)f3'Zr-1 + L (Ily; - wilx;)D.Zr-i 
i=I 
+ µy - wµx + Eyr - WExr (2) 
k-1 
D.Xr = axf3'Z1-1 + L Ilx;D.Zr-i + µx + Exr· (3) 
i=l 
In the above, a, TI,, ... , Ilk_,, Er, and D are decomposed correspondingly 
and w = DyxDxi, the stochastic properties of the conditioning variables, are 
well defined. The various relevant exogeneities also become testable in the 
factorized system. 
If the parameter vector of interest denoted e, e.g., the coefficient vector of 
a unique cointegration relationship or of the conditional equation in our case, 
is a function only of the parameters of the conditional equation and if the 
parameters of the conditional and marginal distributions (>..,, >..2) belong to 
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the product of their individual parameter spaces (A 1 X A 2) and are thus 
variation free, the variables in X1 are weakly exogenous for the e. A formal 
test of weak exogeneity for the parameter f3 in n = af3' is due to Johansen 
(l 992a) and an extended test of weak exogeneity for all of the long-run and 
short-run coefficients in the conditional equation as parameters of interest is 
given by Urbain (1992). Weak exogeneity implies that the conditional equa-
tion contains as much information as the full UV AR system about the parame-
ters of interest in the equation. In particular, if there is only one cointegrating 
relation, the analysis of model (1) can be reduced to the well-known single-
equation analysis. In our case, the derived conditional investment determina-
tion equation does not lose any information on the parameters of interest, 
i.e., both long-run and short-run coefficients in the conditional equation, when 
compared with the corresponding completely specified vector system (UV AR) 
so long as r = 1. 
3.2. The Long-Run Investment Function 
The data set consists of annual observations of fixed investment by state 
sector (/), the defiator of I (P), a 3-year moving average of grain output per 
capita (GM), and energy consumption per capita (E). 11 The sample period is 
1953-1995 and the appendix provides details of the data sources. Throughout 
lower-case letters represent natural logarithms of the corresponding capitals 
and~ denotes the first-difference operator. Our sample size of 43 observations 
is admittedly small for integration and cointegration analyses. While attempts 
have been made to correct for small-sample biases, the limitations inherent 
in a small sample need to be borne in mind when interpreting the findings. 
The findings should be treated as instructive rather than definitive. On the 
other hand, compared with the existing research, the sample used here is one of 
the largest. More importantly, the results lend themselves easily to economic 
interpretation and exhibit well-specified and well-fitted statistical properties. 
To test for the existence of autoregressive unit roots in the nondeterministic 
components of the individual series, the ADF procedure for i, gm, and e and 
Perron's additive outlier model for p are used (Dickey and Fuller, 1979; 
Perron, 1994). The test results suggest that i, gm, and p appear to be /(1); e 
looks like /(0) with trend at the 5% level but /(1) at the 1 % level. Once we 
11 We use a lagged 3-year (t, t - I, t - 2) moving average of grain output per capita because 
at least 2 or 3 years of consecutive good (bad) harvests can create expectations that the bottleneck 
of agriculture has been significantly relieved (narrowed). Hence, either investment booming is 
guaranteed or contraction is urged. However, a single good (bad) harvest alone is not sufficient 
to stimulate such expectations. 
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investigate the joint integration properties of the data by UV AR cointegration 
analysis, all of them appear to be /(1) processes. 12 
In order to examine the cointegration property of the basic system (i, e, 
gm, p), the Gaussian FIML cointegration procedure proposed by Johansen 
and Juselius (1990) is applied. The dimension of the cointegration space 
could be determined by means of maximal eigenvalue CA.max) and trace (A.trace) 
likelihood ratio (LR) test statistics. However, in the case of a small sample, 
the Johansen procedure may overreject a true null, as pointed out by Reimers 
(1992). Thus, we employ Reimers' small-sample correction by using (T -
nk)log(l - A;) instead of T log(l - A;) for the test statistics, which typically 
improves the properties of LR tests for cointegration in moderately sized 
samples. The test outcomes with k = 2 and a restricted constant are presented 
in Table 1. They indicate that we can reject r = 0 at the 5% level and accept 
the other hypotheses. The graphic test for cointegration relations (Fig. 1) 
shows that the relationship f3' cz; 1 )'' which corresponds to the first eigenvec-
tor, {3, in Table 1, looks fairly stationary but all of the others appear to be 
distinctly nonstationary. Based on these findings we proceed on the assump-
tion that we have one cointegration vector and three unit roots. 
Table 1 also reports the standardized eigenvectors and the corresponding 
adjustment coefficient vectors derived from the maximization of the likelihood 
function of model (1). The cointegration vector f3 will characterize a long-run 
solution to an investment determination equation if the relevant cointegration 
relation is homogeneous of degree one in p. Table 2 presents the results of 
testing for unitary elasticity of energy per capita, price homogeneity of degree 
one, and double elasticity of grain output per capita, along with the clarified 
long-run investment determination relation. These tests are based on the Jo-
hansen and Juselius (1992) LR tests of linear restrictions on f3. The results 
suggest that we should accept the following well-performed long-run invest-
ment function for China: 13 
i - p = e + 2.0gm + 13.74. (4) 
Equation ( 4) indicates that the long-run real investment level in China has 
12 The misspecification tests for model ( 1) are not reported here to save space. The results can 
be obtained from the author by request. 
13 In order to confirm this result for readers who prefer explicit standard errors presented 
together with the estimated equation, an unrestricted autoregressive distributed lag of i on p, e, 
and gm with two successive lags has also been estimated. The solved static long-run solution is 
i = 1.19p + I.Ole + l.95gm + 13.48, 
(0.11) (0.06) (0.27) ( 1.36) 
(4*) 
which is not different statistically from Eq. (4). However, Eq. (4) given before is based on the 
Johansen procedure and demonstrates empirically the cointegration property of the basic system. 
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Hypothesis 
Eigenvalue 
hmax by T-nk 
95% Quantile 
Atrace by T-nk 
95% Quantile 
e 
gm 
p 
Constant 
/::;,i 
/::;.e 
/::;,gm 
/::;,p 
LAIXIANG SUN 
TABLE I 
The Cointegration Analysis of Model (l) 
r=O r = I r = 2 r = 3 
0.607 0.425 0.272 0.160 
30.85 18.28 10.50 5.75 
28.10 22.00 15.70 9.20 
65.37 34.52 16.24 5.75 
53.10 34.90 20.00 9.20 
Eigenvector 
{3 b1 h2 b3 
1.000 -0.728 -0.086 -0.139 
-1.000 1.000 -0.156 -0.218 
-2.015 3.366 1.000 -9.487 
-1.175 2.035 0.041 1.000 
13.800 -21.88 -4.423 56.03 
Adjustment coefficient 
a a1 ai aJ 
-0.939 0.171 1.048 -0.009 
-0.027 -0.058 0.733 0.002 
0.026 0.021 -0.027 0.005 
-0.050 0.034 -0.012 -0.009 
Note. "By T-nk" indicates the Reimers' (1992) small-sample correction by replacing T by T-
nk in both Amax and A1race statistics, where n is the dimension of the vector system and k is the 
lag length in Model (I) . The critical values are taken from Table 1 (case I) in Osterwald-Lenum 
(1992). 
moved along the supply possibilities frontier of bottleneck sectors and the 
distributive barrier between industrial expansion and needed agricultural 
growth, represented by the effective energy supply and per capita grain output, 
respectively. In other words, the binding constraints on the long-run level of 
real investment demand are these supply and distributive barriers. Another 
important implication of Eqi. ( 4) is that it serves as a statistical expression 
for an equilibrium relationship among real investment, energy, and grain 
supplies. As a consequence1 the error term, {i - p - e - 2.0gm L-i, represents 
the previous disequilibrium and should be a powerful explanatory variable 
for the next direction of movement of i1 or (i - p)1 • More concretely, when 
the error is positive (negative), i1_ 1 and (i - p)1 are too high (low) relative to the 
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vector!=-- vector2=--
J..5 
. 2 J..2 
" 
.9 
-.2 .6 
-.4 .3 
-.6 
" J.965 J.975 J.985 J.995 J.965 J.975 J.985 J.995 
vector3=-- vecto:r4=--
. 3 
. 2 
. J. 
" 
- . J. 
-.2 
J.965 J.975 J.985 J.995 J.965 J.975 J.985 J.995 
FIG. 1. The graphic tests for cointegration relations /J'(Z; 1 )' . Vector I represents the relation-
ship {3'(Z; l)' ; vectors 2, 3, and 4 correspond to relationships h;(z; l)' , b~(Z; l)', and b~(Z; I), 
respectively. Please refer to Eq. (2) and Table I. 
equilibrium comovement path and the economic agents will reduce (increase) i 
in future periods relative to the comovement path. 
The estimated adjustment coefficient vector a suggests that the disequilib-
rium error /3'(Z; l)' has an important impact on !:::.i, while its influence on 
!:::.e, !:::.gm, and !:::.pis less significant. This is confirmed by running Johansen's 
TABLE 2 
Tests for Linear Restriction on (3 and Weak Exogeneity 
Hypothesis (H.) LR(H., Ho) Hypothesis (H.) LR(H., H0) 
/32 = -1.0 (/31 = 1.0) 0.000 (1.00) ll'1 = 0 4.89 (0.03) 
(3 3 = -2.0 (/31 = 1.0) 0.003 (0.95) ll'2 = 0 0.06 (0.81) 
(3, = - 1.0 (/31 = 1.0) 2.586 (0.11) 0'3 = 0 0.47 (0.49) 
{3 =(I , -1, -2, -1, *)' 2.832 (0.42) 0'4 = 0 0.19 (0.66) 
ll'2 = 0'3 = 0'4 = 0 0.87 (0.83) 
Note. LR(H., H0) are Johansen and Juselius' (1992) LR statistics for testing H. in H0 : r = 1, 
asymptotically x2(3) distributed on the null of (3 = (1, -1, -2, -1, *)' and a 2 = a 3 = a 4 = O; 
and x2(1) distributed on the null of the others. "*" in (3 means no restriction on the constant 
element. 
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(1992b) LR tests of linear restrictions on a. Table 2 also records these tests 
for the hypotheses a; = 0 (i = 1, 2, 3, 4), where a; is the ith element of a. 
As shown by Johansen (1992a) and Urbain (1992), a; = 0 is equivalent to 
the ith component of Z1 being weakly exogenous for the long-run parameters 
in f3 as well as for the short-run parameters in the conditional equation. The 
test statistics in Table 2 show consistently that the weights of the cointegration 
relationship in the /j.e, /j.gm, and /j.p equations are not significantly different 
from zero, implying that energy, grain, and inflation are weakly exogenous in 
the system. Thus it becomes possible to construct a well-specified conditional 
investment growth equation based on Eq. (2) to capture fully the dynamics 
of investment determination represented in model (1). 
3.3. Investment Growth Rate Equation 
Based on the cointegration transformation that restricts TI to equal af3', 
model (2) becomes an /(0) equation and can be estimated by OLS. After a 
subsequent simplification in order to obtain a more concise, yet congruent, 
data characterization, the results of estimation, with the usual standard errors, 
are reported in Table 3. 
The goodness of fit measured by R2 and Ct is highly significant, and all of 
diagnostic statistics indicate that the investment growth rate equation is well-
specified. The overall parameter constancy of the conditional equation is 
confirmed by recursive estimation. Figure 2 shows the sequence of one-step-
ahead Chow tests, i.e., structural break test, none of which are significant. 
Figure 2 also records the one-step residuals and the corresponding ±2 standard 
errors to show that the standard error Ct is almost constant over the sample. 
The constancy of each coefficient, except the /j.p 1_ 1' s, is also confirmed by 
the same recursive estimation; the relevant figures have been omitted here 
for simplicity. The recursive t statistics for /j.p 1_ 1's coefficient show that 
/j.p 1_ 1' s impact is dominated by the striking outlier after 1985 when the 
industrial price reform was initiated; before 1985 the impact was not signifi-
cant statistically. Together these suggest that the equation is a well-specified 
and well-fitted investment growth rate equation with parameter constancy 
over the sample period (1953-1995). 
The investment growth rate equation has a clear economic interpretation. 
First, the estimated coefficient of cointegration, i.e., error-correction term, 
reveals a large and significant adjustment to disequilibrium deviations of 
real investment levels from their normal level determined by the long-run 
investment function. In other words, on average, the investment agents de-
crease (increase) their real investment outlays by about 83% of the last year's 
over- (under-) investment. Second, notwithstanding this disequilibrium im-
pact, the short-run bottleneck multipliers of effective energy supply for basic 
producer goods and grain output for basic consumer goods are significantly 
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TABLE 3 
The Estimation of an Investment Growth Rate Equation in China 
Explanatory variable 
D.(i-p),_1 
6e1 
6gm1 
D,p,_I 
(i - p - e - 2.0 gm),_1 
Constant 
Type of test 
R1 
8-
DW 
F(5,35) 
Normality x2(2) 
AR 1-2 F(2,33) 
ARCH I F(l ,33) 
Hetero F(I0,24) 
Functional form F(20,14) 
Reset F(l ,34) 
Dependent variable: D.(i-p), 
Coefficient 
0.233 
1.547 
2.311 
1.154 
0.833 
11.437 
Test value 
0.90 
0.09 
1.86 
65.70 
0.42 
0.61 
0.06 
I. I I 
1.24 
1.63 
Standard error 
0.072 
0.110 
0.424 
0.277 
0.124 
1.696 
Probability 
0.00 
0.81 
0.55 
0.82 
0.40 
0.34 
0.21 
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Nore. 8- is the estimated standard deviation of residuals. The normality x2(2) is the Jarque-
Bera statistic. AR i-j F(q, T-K-q) is the Lagrange Multiplier test for the ith- to jth-order residual 
autocorrelation (q = j - i + I; T = the number of observations, and K = the number of 
regressors in the equation). ARCH 1-q F(q, T-K-2q) is the qth autoregressive conditional hetero-
scedasticity test. Hetero F(q, T-K-q-1) is White's test for heteroscedasticity and tests the joint 
significance in a regression of the squared residuals on the regressors and their squares. Functional 
form F(q, T-K-q-1) is a general test for functional form misspecification/heteroscedastic errors. 
RESET F(q, T-K-q) is Ramsey's test for specification error. Probability in test-panel is the 
probability values of the test statistics under the relevant null hypothesis. 
greater than zero; their values are quite close to the corresponding long-run 
multipliers in Eq. (4). Third, previous real investment growth does have a 
significant short-run inertia as discussed by Bauer (1978) and others, which 
is indeed consistent with certain characteristics of a socialist economy. Fourth, 
the significant positive correlation between 6.(i - p) and 6.p,_ 1 reflects the 
basic fact that, in a bureaucratically coordinated economy, an increase in the 
price level is not only a result of overinvestment but also, perhaps more 
significantly, a reason to request extra investment at least in the short-run 
because shifting the blame of extraexpenditure to rising input prices is 
straightforward and appears to be more reasonable (Komai, 1992, pp. 548-
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FIG. 2. One-step residuals , ±2 standard errors, and one-step-ahead Chow tests for the invest-
ment growth rate equation. Res I step is the one-step residual; SE is the standard error. I i CHOW 
is the one-step-ahead Chow test; 5% crit. is the normalized critical value at the 5 % significant 
level. 
552). This effect was relatively limited before reform but has played an 
increasingly important role during reform, as shown by the recursive t statis-
tics mentioned in preceding paragraph. The variable 6.p1_, also represents a 
short-run shortage signal translated by the market component of the economy. 
However, the investment growth rate equation implies that this effect is over-
balanced by the impact of offering a bargaining reason for requesting addi-
tional investment. Finally, the parameter constancy indicates that there is a 
lack of structural break induced by the reform. 
The deeper constancy prevailing in the determination of the investment 
cycles does not imply that the concrete and immediate adjustment mechanism 
remains unchanged over time. Concrete adjustment processes can be quite 
different due to changing patterns in the distribution of power among different 
political groups and between the central and the local governments. The most 
significant change has taken place in the reforming years when inflation 
barriers played an increasingly important role in the investment adjustment 
process; this may make Kalecki's growth theory more relevant to China. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Industrial accumulation and investment cycles are recurring subjects in the 
literature about socialist and developing economies. This paper advances the 
standard investment cycle theory of a socialist economy by introducing a 
new framework of growth cycle using the recently developed cointegration 
approach and incorporating the distributive barrier theory related to a typical 
dual developing economy. It is shown empirically that there is a persistent 
tension between system-generated investment ambitions and the supply and 
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distributive barriers to ambitions for both pre- and postreform periods and in 
the presence of significant policy changes. As a result, the long-run investment 
function is characterized by equilibrium comovement among the real fixed 
investment level, grain output per capita as a proxy for necessary consumer 
goods, and effective energy supply per capita as a proxy for basic producer 
goods. Much of the cyclical pattern of the investment growth rate can be 
explained by the adjustment to the comovement path and by the relevant rates 
of change of energy supply and agricultural output. The fact that both func-
tions maintain parameter constancy over the sample period indicates that there 
is a lack of structural break induced by the reform. This constancy, together 
with the surprising structural rigidity of the state industrial sector, may suggest 
that China's state investment system is still following its own logic and has 
not actively responded to the significant changes in demand occurring in 
a rapidly growing and transforming economy. Furthermore, the investment 
decision-making process is still dominated by bureaucratic negotiation based 
on vested sectoral interests and structural inertia, although the concrete mecha-
nisms have changed. 
The complicated bureaucratic coordination and bottleneck constraints have 
caused widespread investment inefficiency manifested as lasting and large-
scale duplication of construction at national level, initiation of too many 
new projects at the expense of technical updating of existing assets, greater 
prominence of gestation lags between the initiation and completion of invest-
ment projects, and in some projects having little value once their products 
face market demand and competition (cf., e.g., People's Daily, 26 April 1994; 
World Bank, 1994; Naughton, 1995). In order to eliminate the scourge of 
investment inefficiency, deeper reform of the state investment system is re-
quired. Reforming the state investment system involves several difficult is-
sues, namely, tackling the problems of central-local relationships and the 
relationships among government, enterprises, and banks, solving the soft bud-
get constraint of the state sector. These difficulties can be overcome gradually 
by reform strategies such as the denationalization of state enterprises and 
state banks, and market reinforced decentralization (Sun, 1989; World Bank, 
1994; Montinola et al., 1995). 
APPENDIX: DAT A SOURCES AND NOTES 
(i) Notations: Investment is fixed investment by state-owned units at cur-
rent prices and in billion yuan. Grain is total output of grain in millions of tons. 
Energy is overall energy consumption in millions of tons of coal equivalents. 
Population is total population in millions. Price index is the price index of 
fixed investment by state-owned units. The grain output per capita and energy 
consumption per capita are expressed in kilograms. 
(ii) Investment, grain, energy, and population data for 1951-1992 are 
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taken directly from the Statistical Yearbook of China (Yearbook, hereafter, 
1993, pp. 149, 364, 477, and 81) and for 1993-1995, data are from Yearbook 
(1994, p. 140; 1995, p. 138; 1996, pp. 140, 371, 203, and 69). 
(iii) Price index: Since the official statistics for this index started only in 
1989, we must find a proper proxy for it before 1989. Figures for 1952-1985 
are the deftator of accumulation on fixed assets of state-owned units (AFAS). 
The deftator can be generated based on the ASAF' s value series at current 
prices and an index series at comparative prices taken from Statistics on 
National Income: 1949-1985 (pp. 37 and 40). Because accumulation is the 
newly added fixed assets (less depreciation of the total fixed assets) plus the 
newly acquired circulating fund and the latter accounts for about only 25% 
of the total (Yearbook, 1993, pp. 76 and 48), we claim that this deflator is 
the best proxy for the price index of fixed investment by state sector in 
China's statistics. The most suitable proxy data for 1986-1988 are price 
indices of state-owned construction output values which were published after 
1982 (Statistical Survey of China, 1987, p. 75; 1988, p. 73; 1990, p. 82; 
1994, p. 89), because construction accounts for about 60% of the investment 
(Yearbook, 1993, p. 150). The figure for 1989 is from China Economic Year-
book (1990, pp. II-32). Data for 1990-1993 are from Economic Situation 
and Prospect of China, (1991-1992; pp. 202, 209; 1992-1993, p. 207; 1993-
1994, p. 3) and, for 1994 and 1995, data are from People's Daily (March 2, 
1995, p. 2; March 5, 1996, p. 2). 
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